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Trade and the Import Control System in Colombia: 
Some Quantifiable Features* 
Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro 
Yale University 
Industrialization and trade are tightly linked in developing countries, 
and Colombia is no exception. Most stages in the growth of the factory 
sector involve replacement of actual or potential imports by domestic pro­
duction. In early phases, while this process focusses on final consumer 
goods, the new local production depends heavily on imported inputs and 
capital goods. Often delayed by policy, the stage of manufacturing exports 
may arrive, as it now has in Colombia, and then it is the ability to switch 
from the local market to the vast world market which permits expansion at 
a much faster rate than the growth of domestic demand. Manufacturing growth 
is, in the whole sequence, related to changes in trade patterns. 
Manufacturing output tends to rely more on produced capital goods than 
does agriculture, and most economists would probably accept the proposition 
that as the K/L ratio rises in a country the share of factory manufacturi~g 
1in output will rise, this more or less regardless of the presence or absense 
of various possible types of trade barriers. For several reasons, econo-
mists want to understand both the process of growth and changing trade patterns, 
given any set of trade barriers or stimuli, and the effect of changes in the 
set of trade barriers or stimuli. In the latter field, the degree of 
validity of the infant industry argument for protection has long been a key 
question. Earlier chapters have presented some evidence consistent with its 
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validity in Colombia: Chapter 2 pointed to the growing up of the textile 
industry from an often decried white elephant in its first decade or so 
to a highly competitive industry, one of the prides of Colo~bian manufactur­
ing. Chapters 4 and 5 measured for learning by doing in two s~parate 
industries and found it to be significant. This evidence by no means per­
mits us to reach an overall evaluation of Colombian protectionist policies. 
Even less solid evidence is available on the impa~t of export promotion 
policies on the efficiency of the aided industries. 2 Such analyses are 
complicated by the fact that import substituting and exporting activities 
.are frequently carried out by the same firms. 
The importance of learning by doing is, then, of key importance in the 
prediction of output effects of trade barriers, or stimuli in the case of 
new exports. When one turns to the income distribution impact of trade, a 
long established bod)1 of literature is available to suggest hypotheses. 
Assuming that trade is based on relative factor abund~nce, protection of 
relatively capital intensive domestic industries (manufacturing which has 
to be protected in a labour abundant country presumably fits this category) 
is predicted to raise the. share of capital and to worsen the personal distribu­
tion of income; exports of manufactures which are competitive will presumably 
be labour intensive so the activity will raise the labour share and improve 
income distribution. But these simple Heckscher-Ohlin predictions are ob­
viously open to question and qualification. 3 A most obvious qualification 
is raised by the fact (see Chapter 6) that factor proportions seem to be as 
much or more related to firm or plant size as to industry or sector, capital 
intensity being an increasing function of size. Chapter 6 raises many doubts 
about the often assumed positive relation between size and efficiency. 
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Before a persuasive interpretation of the impact of trade in manu­
facturing products or the quality of trade policy can be evolved, it is 
clear that certain detailed types of information are necessary. What types 
of firms import and export? How does the existing trade control system 
discriminate, if at all, among these types? 
This essay will seek some light on these questions by analyzing 1970 
registered imports according to size of importers. seenIt will be that 
fa1:1iliarity with about 500 major private importers allows import control 
authorities to be reasonably sure about the destination of half of register­
ed imports. It is not far fetched to suppose that those 500 major importers 
make up the core of the Colombian socioeconomic system, and that they and 
INcrnmx4 authorities know each other fairly well. With half of imports going 
to 500 companies, and about 20 percent going to the public sector, only 30 
percent has to be distributed in retail fashion. 
The chapter will also attempt a quantification of some aspects of INCCMEX 
behavior in accepting or rejecting import requests, as revealed in its handling 
of a sample of such requests during 1971. The data will also show that a good 
share of major industrial exporters is to be found among major importers. 
Major Colombian Importers in 1970 
From a sample of import license requests made in the second semester 
of 1971, two types of information were obtained: a census-like coverage of 
all imports, exports, etc., for each company (not plant) in 1970, and data 
on the specific import request for the second semester of 1971 (amount, re­
jection or acceptance, reasons for rejections, etc.). The former type of 
information will be discussed first. 
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Following INCOME{ categories, major private importers can be subdivided 
into an industrial and a commercial group. Industrial importers use imports 
in their production process; connnercial importers resell the foreign goods 
to local buyers. While "Resolution 15" forms give no information on the 
ownership of the company making the import request, a somewhat rough-and-ready 
5
separation was also made according to presumed nationality. In general, it 
was presumed that a company was Colombian-owned unless there was firm evi­
dence to the contrary. Only companies for which foreign ownership was SO 
percent or more were placed under the category of foreign-owned; all others 
were regarded as national. There were, however, relatively few joint­
ventures in the sample. Note that the definition of foreign-owned companies 
used here is considerably weaker than that used in the Andean code on foreign 
investment. Lack of reliable and up-to-date data was the major reason for 
choosing our weaker definition. 
6Table 1 presents a summary of major industrial importers, classified 
according to their registered imports during 1970, and whether the companies 
were national or foreign owned. Data on the number of employees, minor 
exports, and income and sales taxes paid by these companies are also pre­
sented. Three subdivisions according to size are made: companies which 
imported more than one ri1illion dollars in 1970; those importing between half 
a million and one million; and those whose imports ranged bett1een $100,000 
and half a million. 
Table 1 shows a striking degree of concentration, t1hich helps explain 
the relatively smooth operation of the Colombian import control system. Thus, 
just 80 industrial companies captured in the sample accounted for 30 percent 
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of all 1970 rer;istere<l imports; these same companies accounted for 21.2 
percent of all income and sales truces paid during 1970 in Colombia, and 
employed 19.2 percent of all those engaged in manufacturing in the same 
year. 7 Since, given the way the data were obtained, some large importers 
may have been missed, the estimates presented in Table 1, and those which 
follow, for import concentration, as well as for degree of foreign control, 
are minil:tum ones; further, tl1ere could be cases of several companies being 
under the control of a single conglomerate or family group. 
Note that, even neglecting data problems, it would not be easy to 
interpret the information presented in Table 1. Neither comparable cross­
seciton nor tune-series.data are available for Chenery-like tests of 
"nonnality." Even if they were, further analysis involving variables such 
as industrial structure would be required before establishing whether the 
degree of concentration shown is more or less than could be expected if 
import controls did not exist. 
Table 2 presents parallel data for the commercial category, while Table 
3 combines iufonnation from the previous two tables. There were in 1970 at 
least 100 companies importing more than one million dollars (with an average 
of $3.1 million each), accounting for 34 percent of all registered imports. 
Fifty-five foreign-owned companies in this group by themselves represented 
20 percent of all Colombian registered imports in 1970. 
The degree of concentration falls off rapidly once companies with 
imports of less than one million dollars are considered. Thµs, the 88 com­
panies, foreign and national, industrial and commercial, ,Jhich were found 
to import between half and one million dollars, accounted for only 6 percent 
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of all imports in 1970, while the 312 companies importing between $100,000 
and half a million dollars represented an additional 9 percent of the 
import bill. In round numbers• one can say that 500 companies handled at 
least half of Colombian imports. The same companies accounted for 37 percent 
of all income and sales tax payments, and 32 percent of those employed in 
"modern" commerce and manufacturing. 
Given the economic importance of those firms importing more than one 
million dollars, their names and presumed major activity is given in Annex A. 
This annex and other data (not shown) indicate the heavy concentration of 
import-intensive foreign investors in chemicals, pharmaceuticals and metal­
mechanic industries, which are typically associated with fairly recent 
import substitution. National companies are more spread out among different 
activities._,, 
At least 80 industrial companies importing mo1;e than one million 
dollars a year in 1970/71 hired an average of 923 employees. An additional 
63 companies, importing between half and one million dollars, had each an 
average of 496 employees. Finally, 177 industrial companies in the third 
category, had an average of 310 employees each. A comparision of these 
figures with data reported by the Colombian Hinistry of Labor and Social 
Security suggests that the sample succeeded in registering at least the 
largest Colombian firms, on the assumption that most of the largest finns 
8according to employment are also the largest importers. 
Table 1 reveals major industrial exporters among the major importers. 
9It has been estimated that registered Colombian manufactured ~xports 
(excluding items such as sugar) reached $76.7 million during 1970; the 80 
largest importers would thus account for 49 percent of those exports. The 
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largest 314 industrial importers (excluding several sugar nills) would 
account for 77 percent of manufactured exports. 
A ranking of major importers by level of exports pennits a more 
accurate oeasure of industrial export concentration. The largest 14 
national industrial exporters in the sample (excluding sugar mills) had 
registered industrial exports of $26.89 million in 1970, while the 10 
largest foreign-owned exporting industrial companies had $20.41 million of 
exports of 1970. Thus, 24 industrial companies accounted for 62 percent of 
all (non-sugar) industrial exports. Foreign-owned companies, by themselves, 
represented at least 27 percent of all Colombian industrial exports in 1970. 
Some important characteristics of major industrial importers/exporters 
are highlighted in Table 4. Average wages decline with company size as 
measured by annual imports, but foreign-owned companies show higher wages 
for each size category than national firms. Foreign companies, however, 
also have higher imports per employee, for each size category, than do 
national companies, with imports per employee declining with size for both 
groups. The 49 foreign-owned industrial companies importing more than one 
million dollars each show an astounding level of $6,557 worth of imports per 
employee, and although their exports per employee are higher than those of 
national firms in the same import size category, their "trade deficit" re­
mains far superior to that of any other category. As a rule, large foreign­
owned companies are more concentrated in Bogota than large national firms. 
These characterist.ics will be reexamined for all compan;i:es in the sample in 
a later section of this paper. 
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Among the most striking facts about the 24 mjaor exporters, 10 
foreign-owned and 14 national, are: (a) the persistence of a "trade 
deficit," and (b) the large average size of these coopanies. (See the 
last two rows of Table 4.) Neither fact fits well with an inage of firms 
producing labor-intensive manufactured exports; rather, it is hinted that 
many of the same companies which in the past benefitted, and which still 
do, from import-intensive import-substitution, now benefit from the newer 
export-promotion policies. It is nevertheless encouraging that these 
I 
companies are less concentrated in Bogota than other 1groups shown in the 
same table. 
Income and sales taxes paid per.employee, like wages and imports per 
employee, appear to decline with company size; in contrast with the cases of 
wages and imports, the national companies show higher tax payments per 
employee in the two smallest size categories. In spite of their large 
average size, the 24 large exporters show relatively small cash tax payments, 
a fact which may be explained by Colombian export subsidy schemes. 
In summary, a picture of substantial concentration emerges from this 
review of major 1970 private importers. It is not possible to say from 
the reviewed data whether such concentration is higher or lower than in 
other countries, nor whether or not it is encouraged or discouraged by the 
import control system. (More on this below.) But the data help explain 
why the management of import controls is not as impossible a task as it 
appears at first sight when one is told that a handful of authorities decide 
on about 150,000 import applications per year. Some 500 private companies 
act as major actors not only in the import field, but also as major exporters 
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and tax collectors for the government. Note that only income and sales tax 
data have been discussed; those 500 companies must also pay a very large 
share of all import duties. 10 
Revealed INC<:!1EX Criteria for Accepting or Rejecting Import License Requests 
The analysis of characteristics of license requests approved or rejected 
(partly or totally) by INC<lIEX during the second semester of 1971 can shed 
some light on the question of biases created by the import control system, 
as compared with a regime without quantitative restrictions. Table 5 presents a 
tabulation of the reasons given by INCOHEX for rejecting import requests in 
the sample; more than one reason is frequently given. The potential import-
er is handed a mimeographed sheet in which the listed reasons for rejection 
are presented, with those applying to his request bearing a check mark. 
A good share of rejections are only partial, particularly under the 
industry category. Hore serious rejections appear to be based on protectionist 
grounds, as reflected in reasons #1, 2, and, very likely, in 8 and 9. For 
the commercial category these four reasons add up to 46 percent of the 
reasons for rejection, while for industry the correspondins figure is 40 
percent. The commercial requests also seem to be particularly scrutinized 
for "excessive" imports (reason /Ill) and tax evasion (reason //13). Industrial 
requests are watched for overinvoicing (reason #4); in this area INCOMEX 
claims to have saved the country several million dollars by keeping foreign­
owned companies, especially those in the pharmaceutical field, from remitting 
excessive profits to their headquarters abroad via overinvoicing. Such claims 
11 appear to be substantially correct. 
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The average characteristics of approved, rejected and partially re­
jected import requests in the industrial and commercial categories are laid 
out in Table 6. Note first that our sample picked up a higher average of 
rejected requests than seems to have been typical during the second semester 
of 1971. While at that time it was said that only about 10 percent of all 
requests were being turned down, 25 percent of the industrial requests, and 
43 percent of commercial requests appear as totally rejected. The companies 
appearing in the sample are on average larger than those in the whole 
industrial and commercial sector; while this fact in itself is not surprising, 
it is also probably true that the sample is biased in the direction of over­
representing larger importing £inns and larger import requests. 
The large standard deviations sho-wn in Table 6 warn of the difficul~y in 
generalizing with confidence about the characteristics of accepted, rejected 
and partially rejected requests. Note also that the listed characteristics 
omit, due to lack of data, very important features of the import requests: 
whether or not, for example, the requested import was or was not competitive 
with some local production, and also whether the requested imports originated 
in com1tries having preferential trade agreements with Colcmbia. 
In spite of these limitations, an attempt has been made to establish 
what characteristics of the import requests, and of the company making them, 
made INC0NEX more likely to accept such petitions. As some important inde­
pendent variables are left out of the analysis, we cannot expect to obtain 
good fits. A less ambitious goal will be to isolate characteristics which 
significantly influence INCOfEX in the decision to accept or reject each 
application, ceteris paribus. The analysis may be interpreted as measuring 
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an INCOMEX supply function for import licenses, while neglecting the demand 
function for such licenses, or assuming, as a not unreasonable first approx­
imation, that the demand for licenses is perfectly elastic at th~ going 
transaction costs involved in applications. 
The dependent variable, to be statistically explained, is somewhat 
unusual. If all applications are divided simply into those accepted or 
rejected, that variable will only take values of zero for rejections, or 
one for approvals. Under these dichotomous circlDllstances, multivariate 
probit analysis is known to be a superior technique to the usual least 
. l . 12square mu1tip e regressions. In our sample, applications partly rejected 
present an intermediate case, which can be handled in different ways. In 
what follows, the probit analysis will be applied in three ways: 
leaving out partial rejections, treating them as total rejections, and also 
treating them as total approvals. The dependent variable for partially 
rejected requests can also be expressed as the fraction of the value of the 
license granted by INCCY-'fEX; in that case, there will be intermediate obser­
vations between zero and one. Ordinary least squares will be used to analyze 
this fashion of expressing the dependent variable. 
Table 7 and 8 present the best results obtained, best being determined 
by the number of coefficients which had interesting values relative to their 
standard errors. Several other independent variables, not shm.-m, were 
unsuccessfully tried. On the whole, it will be seen that the different 
techniques used to analyse the data yield similar qualitative results. 
Import requests under ·the non-reimbursable category, i.e., those which 
do not involve an immediate clam on foreign exchange resources, clearly 
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have a much better chance of being approved than those under the reimbursa­
ble category, both under the industrial and commercial classifications. 
Smaller import requests also have a clearly better chance of being approved, 
for both the industrial and comnercial classifications, than larger re­
quests. When partial rejections are counted as approvals on the supposition 
that either the company will be happy to obtain a share of its perhaps 
inflated request, or that it can always present a new request later on, the 
significance of the coefficient for the absolute size of the import request 
declines but remains high. As seen in Table 6, the average value of 
license applications which were partially rejected uere higher than those 
for complete approvals and rejections. A breakdown of requests into ten 
groups according to the size of requests shows the negative relation between 
complete approval and size of request to be quite smooth, with the percentage 
of total approvals declining steadily from 77 percent for the smallest to 
36 percent for the largest in the case of reimbursable industrial requests. 
In the commercial category the decline in the acceptance rate is even 
steeper. On the whole, these facts indicate that INC<:llEX authorities, besides 
their protectionist guidelines, still operated during the second semester 
of 1971 vith an eye (somewhat myopic) to rationing foreign exchange. 
Do large firms have a better chance of obtaining desired licenses than 
snaller firms? Size was measured in two ways: number of employees and 
value of 1970 import registrations. Both measures gave substantially the 
same results; those using 1970 imports are shown in Table 7, for industrial 
requests, while those using ereployment levels are used in Table 8, for 
commercial requests. The hypothesis being tested is that chances for approval 
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increase steadily with size, even when other company and license character­
istics are also taken into account. For the industrial category, the 
hypothesis receives only modest support; when partial rejections are treated 
as approvals, which for large companies may be quite suitable, that support 
is strongest. In the commercial category, the significance of the size 
variable is uniformly superior to that for industrials, and indicates a 
clear and smooth link between size and chances of approval, even after 
other variables are taken into account. He return to this issue below. 
Company size is of course highly correlated with variables such as 
taxes paid and exports. Therefore, some other independent variables were 
defined relative to the size variable. Taxes paid, relative to either 
imports or employees, significantly increased chances for approval in 
the case of industrial license requests; somewhat surprisingly, the 
evidence for such a hypothesis is much weaker in the commercial group. 
Also surprisingly, a significant negative link appears for industrial re­
quests between minor exports, relative to imports, and chances of approval. 
This result is inconsistent with the usual INCOHEX claims that industrial 
exporters are favored in .the granting of import licenses. However, as shown 
in Table 12, a closer look at the data casts doubts on the robustness of 
this revealed negative link, at least for companies located in Bogota or 
Medellin. It remains possible that some INCOMEX officials felt that large 
exporters (relative to their 1970 imports) were already obtaining enough 
fresh imports via the "Plan Vallejo," which are exempted from prior licenses. 
Most participants in the "Plan Vallejo" are large firms • 
.f 
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Finally, a look at the correlation coefficients among the independent 
variables shown in Table 7 and 8 fails to show widespread collinearity 
problems. Indicating the independent variables in Table 7 as x1 , x2 , •. •, 
x
9
, following the order in which they are shown in that table, their corre­
lation coefficients are as follows: 
X X X 
5 6 8 
-0.01 
0.08 -0.78 
-0.20 0.16 -0.16 
0.07 -0.24 0.36 -0.09 
0.01 -0.51 o.so -0.12 0.24 
0.10 0.33 -0.37 0.05 -0.06 -0.13 
-0.01 -0.02 0.01 o.oo o.oo 0.03 -0.02 
0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.03 -0.14 0.02 0.02 
Similar results are obtained for the independent variables of Table 8. 
There~ interesting relationships among the size, export, wage and tax 
variables discussed for major importers in the first section of this 
paper and to be further explored below, but they do not appear to serious­
ly mar the results of Tables 7 and 8. 
Industrial Company Size and Chances of Approval: A Closer Look 
The hypotheses dealing with the links between chances of approval and 
size, geographical location, and generation of minor exports will be further 
examined in this section for industrial corlpanies. It will be shown that 
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the largest industrial companies, particularly those in Bogota and Medell'ln, 
do in fact have a better chance than smaller firr.1s for obtaininr; import 
licenses. 
The data, as shown in the last cohmms of Tables 9 and 10, indicate 
that the percentage of requests falling under the non-reimbursable category 
is noticably higher for the largest companies. These tables, and those 
which follow, consider only license applications which had been totally 
rejected or approved. The link between size and share of non-reimbursables 
in total request is~ a smoothly increasing one; indeed, as one moves 
from the smallest to the largest firms it seems to dip before rising most 
clearly for the largest firns. It was seen earlier, and Tables 9 and 10 
confirm, that requests under the non-reimbursable category have a much 
higher chance of being accepted than those under the reimbursable classifi­
cation. In other words, this fact suggests that unadjusted for the non­
reimbursable/reimbursable variable, the largest companies and exporters 
have a better chance of obtaining approvals, thanks to their better access 
to non-reimbursable licenses, associated with links to foreign credits or 
. 13investments. 
Tables 9 and 10 also show that when only reimbursable license .applica­
tions are considered, the percentage approved shows no clear trend as one 
moves up the size scale, until the largest size categories are reached. Firms 
with more than 466 employees, and/or more than two million US$ imports in 
1970 show reimbursable approval rates 14clearly above average. 
The geographical pattern of approvals and rejections is explored in 
Tables 11 and 12, in relation to employment and minor exports. Sharp 
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differences in approval percentages between Bogota or Hedellin, and the rest 
of Colombia, emerge clearly only for the three largest employment cate­
gories, and the two largest categories of minor exporters. Firms from 
Bogota or Hedell'Ln with at least 50 thousand US$ in minor exports in 1970 
have the. largest percentage of approvals in Table 12, while the largest 
employers in Bogota and Medellin have the most SIJ,Ccessful performance of 
those shown in Table 11. 
In the ·total number of import requests from Bogota and Medellin tmder 
the industrial category, one finds a higher share of requests in the non­
reimbursable group than the corresponding share for the rest of the country 
(12.2 percent vs. 8.5 percent)~ The same is true for the commercial cate­
gory (10.4 percent vs. 5.4 percent). But even if one looks just at the 
~e:imbursable requests, the percentage of approvals is higher for Bogota 
and Medellin for both industrial and commercial categories. 
Of the total requests from foreign-owned industrial companies, 68.4 
percent came from those located in Bogota and Hedell:in, uhile the correspond­
ing percen_tage for national firos was 76.2. The share of non-re:imbursable 
requests in total requests frol!l foreign-at-med industrial companies was 
almost identical to the corresponding share in the requests of national 
firms. Regardless of how requests are sliced, the percentage of approvals 
for 'requests from foreign-aimed industrial companies come out very close to 
those from national finns, although usually slightly lower. 
The result that very large industrial fims located in Bogota or 
Medell:in have a higher approval rate than all others comes out most clearly 
in Table 13, and from its underlying data. When partial rejections are 
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omitted from the sample, the combined approval rate for firms which imported 
less than two million US$ in 1970 ~ were located outside Bogota and 
Medellin was 68.4 percent, in contrast with the 83. 7 percent corresponding 
to the big finns in Hedell:i'.n or Bogota. The null hypothesis, i.e., that 
there is no relation between chances of approval and being a big finn in 
Bogota or Medellin, must be rejected at the one percent level of signifi­
cance. If partial rejections are counted as approvals, the contrast is 
between an approval rate of 86. 7 percent for big firms in Bogota and 
Medellin, versus 73.5 percent for all others. The null hypothesis can 
again be rejected at the one percent level of significance. Finally, if 
partial rejections are registered as plain rejections, the relevant figures 
are 68.1 percent for the large firms in Bogota and Medell1n versus 57.2 
percent for the rest. Now the null hypothesis can be rejected "only" at 
the f . t 1eve1 f signi"f"icance.. 15ive percen o · 
It should be recalled that perhaps the most serious shortcoming of 
the sample data is lack of information on the characteristics of requested 
imports, particularly on whether or not they are competitive with local 
production. It is conceivable, for example, that the higher share of 
approvals for large companies could be explained by their higher requests 
for imports not competitive with Colombian production, such as machinery and 
eqtiipnent (often brought in under the non-reimbursable category) and inputs 
originating in heavy industries. But while available data do not allow a 
test of this hypothesis, I doubt that it could explain fully previous results. 
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The Import-Export-Taxes-Wages Nexus 
The first part of this paper explored some characteristics of the major 
Colombian importers. This seciton will further examine possible inter­
relationships among company size, imports, minor exports, and wages and 
taxes paid, now for all firms appearing in the sample. 
One way of carrying out that analysis is to define, say, company 
":import functions," which try to explain 1970 imports per employee, depend­
ing on size, ownership, etc. Similar attempts can be made to explain 
company minor exports and taxes paid per employee, and company wages. One 
problem with these relations is that the direction of causation is not 
always as clear as suggested by a model specifying dependent and independent 
variables. The results shown in Tables 14 and 15 should therefore be 
interpreted with caution; their usefulness lies primarily in presenting 
in a syste~atic fashion the import-export-taxes-wages nexus found in the 
16
sample data. 
Industrial companies with high imports per employee clearly tend to pay 
relatively high taxes per employee, high wages, and, more surprisingly, 
also have relatively high minor exports per employee. Once this nexus is 
allowed for, th~ size variable as measured in number of employees in fact 
suggests a negative link with per employee imports and exports, although such 
negative connection may be partly spurious. Even after the indicated 
nexus is taken into account, larger industrial companies appear to pay 
higher truces per employee, although not higher wages. For commercial com­
panies the results, shown in Table 15, are clearest regarding the per 
employee import-taxes link, which is particularly strong. 
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A traditional criticism of a system which represses imports by quotas 
rather than duties is that it involves public revenue losses. Tables 14 
and 15 suggest that such a loss is only partial. Either because companies 
eager to obtain import licenses pay higher than average income and sales 
taxes, or because IHCOilEX channels licenses toward especially efficient 
companies, or both, the third column of Table 14 shows that a 10 percent 
increase in imports per employee appears to lead to a 3.6 percent increase 
in sales and income tax revenues of the government. In the commercial 
group, the apparent feedback elasticity is nearly twice as great. 
As argued by some INCOHEX officials, one can view these results as 
forthcoming from a poliGy of channelling the still scarce imports, ceted s 
paribus, toward companies which yield the government high tax returns. It 
is also argued that such conpanies "deserve" in1port permits, as they have 
shmm themselves more efficient (profitable) than the rest, as revealed by 
their high taxes and wages per employee. The chain of cau.sation, of 
course, is unclear, and is likely to run both ways, in a manner difficult 
to untangle either statistically or a priori. 
Companies with high imports per employee also pay higher than average 
wages. Our data have no information regarding industrial allocation nor 
the skill composition of company labor force; conceivably, high imports 
per employee may be correlated with the use of skilled labor commandins 
higher ,,ages. But while such reasoning is plausible for industrial companies, 
it has much less force for commercial companies. Yet, both Tables 14 and 
15 show a strong link between wages and imports. On the whole, the last 
columns of these two tables seem to support the hypothesis that wages are 
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related to the profitability of each company, ,dth access to imports 
being a key element in profitability. 
The dummies for mmership and location emerge as significant in 
several regressions. Foreign-0"1-med industrial companies have higher imports 
per enployee than national ones, and pay higher wages. The commercial ones 
also clearly pay more taxes per employee. The observed results, as in 
earlier cases, could arise from sector and skills variables not included in 
the regression. Foreign-owned pharmaceutical companies, for example, are 
likely to have high per employee imports, and a skilled labor force, not 
because they are foreign-owned, but because they are in pharmaceuticals. 
Industrial companies located in Bogota or Hedell:in, not surprisingly, 
appear to pay better wages, and have both higher than average imports and 
tax payments per employee. For commercial companies, only the tendency 
to pay higher wages in Bogota or Hedell:in remains. 
The "minor export functions" yielded the poorest results, suggesting 
the importance of industrial classification and other variables in explain­
ing export performance. Nevertheless, foreign-owned industrial companies 
and those outside Bogota or Medellin are shown to have higher than average 
minor exports per employee. Hore surprisingly at first sight are coefficients 
for wages and per employee imports: companies with high per employee 
exports tend to import more and pay higher wages. Once these variables 
are taken into account, the size variable adopts a negative sign. But the 
data shown in the two bottom lines of Table 4, regarding the concentration 
of large Iilinor exporters, cannot be gainsaid. 
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Combined with the information shown in Table 4, and those presented 
elsewhere, 17 Colombian industrial minor exports in 1970 and 1971 do not 
emerge as obviously intensive in unskilled labor and national raw materials. 
Whether this is due to a failure of the Hecksher-Ohlin hypothesis in 
explaining the Colombian trade pattern, or the result of distortions 
induced by domestic policy (such as the Plan Vallejo and LAFTA trade) is 
a matter deserving further research. 
Conclus ions 
There is substantial concentration in the distribution of Colombian 
imports, a concentration which makes the control system easier to manage. 
The control system, in tum, appears to buttress such concentration, as it 
gives the largest companies, particularly those located in Bogota or 
Hedell:i'.n, a better chance of obtaining licenses. This conclusion is 
strengthened by the fact that it was obtained even though it could not take 
into account the "discouraged firm" effect. In other words, data on 
actual import requests were generated by a nroup of firms which had some 
hope of receiving a license; this group of companies has an average size 
which is larger than that for all industrial firms. Discouraged firms 
which do not bother to apply are in all likelihood small ones, for which 
transaction costs in license application loom relatively large. These 
smaller finas often en<l up buyinf, imported items from large commercial houses. 
Nevertheless, the bias toward import concentration arising solely 
from preferential treat1i1ent of the largest firms in Bogota or Hedell:fo, 
ceteris paribus, does not appear quantitatively very strong. Access to 
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foreir;n credits and investments, allowing imports without the immediate 
use of foreign exchange, seems a,more powerful force in biasing the opera­
tion of import controls in favor of the larsest (and best connected) com­
panies. One may speculate that much of this concentrating influence would 
survive a possible elimination of import controls. 
This essay has also called attention to the fact that minor industrial 
exports were in 19-70 even more concentrated than imports. Given the 
tendency of large import-intensive companies paying high wages, whatever 
their industrial activity, to use more capital-intensive methods than other 
firms, some skepticism regarding the magnitude and direction of employment 
and income-distributional effects of minor export expansion is warranted, 
at least for the medilUil-run. This, of course, does~ mean that the 
encouragement of minor exports is a mistaken policy, that, balance,nor on 
it may generate somewhat more modern-sector employment than a comparable 
amount of import-substitution. It does suggest, however, that for a given 
overall growth rate, the employment difference 111ay only be marginally 
superior, so long as the 1970 industrial and export structure is maintained. 
Hopefully, such structure could still reflect the early stages of industrial 
export-promotion, which may change as new exporters, less committed to 
earlier import-substituting ventures, enter the field. 
I-1 
Footnotes 
*This essay presents results which will be more fully developed in a 
forthcoming study on the Colombian foreign trade and payments system, 
sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The essay owes 
much to Jose Francisco Escandon, and the INCOHEX authorities who allowed 
him to gather information on a sample of import requests. Very valuable 
help was also provided by Lillian Barros, Stephen Kadish, Christina Laufer 
and Van Whiting. Helpful connnents received during seminars at MIT and 
Columbia University, and from Albert Berry, are gratefully acknowledged. 
1That this sort of natural neoclassical growth process was going on 
in Colombian industry was supported by Chu' s study of supply response on 
changing relative prices over 1930-1945 (Chapter 3). 
2But evidence is available to the effect that exports respond to such 
price stimuli as the exchange rate, export subsidies, etc. See Albert 
Berry, Politica Economica Exterior de Colombia, FEDESARROLLO, 1972; Carlos 
F. Diaz-Alejandro, "Minor Colombian Merchandise Exports," Yale Economic 
Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 149, July, 1972. 
3They do not allow for economies of scale, for trade based on market 
discrimination and decreasing costs, for the complexities of n- good factor 
models, the product cycle, and so on. 
4INCCNEX officials kindly allowed the examination of about 2,500 license 
requests under the commercial.and industrial categories. The sample includes 
cases of several requests frofil the same company.· The requests had been 
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either accepted or rejected, totally or partially, by the "Junta de Importa­
ciones" of INCOHEX. A smaller sample (199) was also taken of requests 
under the official category. In choosing the sample of requests, no refined 
sampling method was followed; one basically tried to get information on 
those requests which were around at the time and were made available for 
examination. As during the second semester of 1971 relatively few applica­
tions were being rejected, a special effort was made to obtain data on 
rejected requests. There was also a bias in favor of obtaining requests 
from as many different ccmpanies as possible. There does not appear to 
exist any particular seaaonal pattern to license requests, except a decline 
in numbers in December and January, so the exclusive use of second semester 
information should not introduce any particular bias. 
5 rn establishing company ownership, heavy reliance was placed on 
knowledgeable Colombians, and on the following: (a) United States Depart­
ment of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce, American Firms, Subsidi­
aries and Affiliates-Colombia (May 1970), Washington, D.C., (b) The 
Fortune Directory; The 300 largest industrials outside the U.S., in Fortune, 
August 1972, pp. 152-61; and (c) American Encyclopedia of International 
Information, Volume 2, Directory of American Firms Operating in Foreign 
Countries, 7th Edition, by Juvenal L. Angel, 1969. 
6 rn several cases, a given company in the sample had import requests 
listed by INCOHEX under both the industrial and commercial categories. In 
all such cases, for the purposes of the tables shown in this chapter, the 
company was placed only under the industrial category. The same procedure 
was followed in the few cases for which a company was listed under both the 
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industrial and the official categories (e.g., Acerias Paz del Rio). 
7Total income and sales taxes paid in cash during 1970 amounted to 
7,220 million pesos, as reported in the Revista del Banco de la Republica. 
These data, as those shown in the tables, exclude tax payments made with 
tax certificates issued in connection with export subsidies. Total nation­
al tax revenues were 12,591 million pesos in the same year. The number of 
workers and employees engaged in manufacturing and registered with the 
Colombian Social Security Institute was 384.6 thousand in December 1970. 
See Gabriel Turbay H., "Una Poll'.tica Industriai Para Est;i.mular Las Export­
aciones y Fomentar el Empleo," Mimeographed, FEDESARROLLO, May 1972, Table 
9. The equivalent amount for the commercial sector was 203.0 thousand. 
For both commerce and manufacturing, the employment figures are limited 
mostly to their "modern" segments, leaving out the "informal sector." 
8See Gabriel Turbay 11., op. cit., Table 9. This source reports the 
following number of firms in mining and manufacturing, for December 1970: 
Size category Number of firms 
More than 500 employees 84 
Hore than 250 and less than 143 
501 employees 
Nore than 100 and less than 487 
251 employees 
Direct comparison of INCOMEX data with those from the Industrial 
Census is not possible, as the latter reports on plants, not companies. 
9See FEDESARROLL0 1 Coyuntura Economica, Volume II, No. 2, July 1972, 
Table X.2, p. 87. 
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Hajor importers under the official category have of course a different 
nature than those listed under industry and commerce. In our sample of 






Registered 1970 imports of 
million dollars 
more than one 
19 $ 130.83 
Registered 1970 imports of betwe
and one million dollars 
en half 
10 7.17 
Registered 1970 imports of betwe
and half a million dollars 
en $100,000 
16 4.11 
Total major official importers 45 $ 142.11 
The largest official importers include institutions such as municipal 
and national public utilities (electricity, telephones, etc.), public 
anencies marketing basic foodstuffs (IDE11A) or rural inputs (Caja Ap,raria), 
the 1'Iinistries of Public Harks and Defense, etc. 
Combining the largest industrial, commercial1 and official importers 
one can see that during 1970,119 institutions accounted for $441 million in 
registered imports, or 48 percent of the total import bill. 
11 see Constantino Vaitsos, "Transfer of Resources and Preservation of 
Monopoly Rents," Harvard Development Advisory Service, Report No. 168, 1970. 
12See James Tobin, "The Application of Hultivariate Prohit Analysis to 
Economic Survey Data," Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1, December 1, 
1955. The condition that the dependent variable must always have a value 
within the interval zero-one cannot be maintained if its expected value is 
assumed to be n linear conbination of the independent variables, as in 
multiple regressions. ''Moreover, the multiple re3ression 1:1odel asstm1es, 
----
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inappropriately for this case, that the distribution of the dependent 
variable arow1d its expected value is independent of the level of that expect­
ed value." (Tobin, p. 2). See also Paul L. Joskow, "A Behavioral Theory of 
Public Utility Regulation," Unpublished ~h.D. --------Dissertation, Yale University, -
1972, for another application of probit analysis. 
13~1~1e averaee va1ue o~40 • d 1 . <l • 1 .import requests un er t1e in ustria non-reim-
bursable category, hovever, was only US$ 8,200, compared to US$ 12,174 for 
those in the reimbursable category. In the commercial group the corresponding 
figures were US$ 2,285 and US$ 5,276, respectively. 
14when partial rejections are counted as approvals, the percentage of 
reimbursable licenses approved according to size, as measured by 1970 
:imports (in thousand US$), are as follows: 




Hore than 2,000 81.3 
lSThe stat istics· · used int· e ch · test (with one degree ofh i-square . 
freedom) are as follows: 
Partial rejections omitted: 8.642 
Partial rejections as acceptances: 8.811 
Partial rejections as rejections: 4.617 
16
Note also that Tables 14 and 15, while relying only on the census­
like information of our sample, has as many observations as Tables 7 and 8. 
- In other words, duplications were not weeded out, and data for a given 
company may appear several times. This is partly to avoid the laborious 
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effort involved in the weeding-out process. It was also noted that in 
several occasions what appeared to be the same company had different infor­
mation in different import requests; this could be due to changes in company 
definitions, in time coverage, or simply to errors of observation. No 
obvious criteria for choosing one set of information over another could 
be devised. As in earlier regressions, when a given company happened to 
have, say, zero minor exports or imports, those zeroes were transformed 
into ones, so the logarithms would make sense. Finally, one may note the 
simple correlation coefficients among the variables appearing in the more 
interesting Table 14. Denoting by x1 , x2 , ••• , x the variables in the7 
order they are presented in Table 14 (under the column labelled "Independent 
Variables," we have the following results: 
Xl 
x2 -0.25 
x3 -0.07 0.09 
x4 0.07 -0.39 0.02 
XS 0.07 -0.21 0.04 0.21 
x6 0.03 -0.47 0.02 0.37 0.32 
x7 -0.22 -0.11 -0.14 0.12 0.12 0.15 
17Albert Berry has noted that data on Colombian industrial two digit 
sectors for 1971 show a positive correlation between share of output export­
ed and horsepower per worker. As of 1971, the major two digit sectors in. 
tenns of gross value of exports were textiles, food products, chemicals, non­
metallic minerals, paper products and leather products. In my "Some 
Table 1 











imports of more than one 
million dollars 
National; industrial; 
imporis of more than one 
million dollars 
Industrial; imports of more 
thnn one million dollars 
Foreign-owned; indus tria1; 
imports of between half and 
one million dollars 
National; industrial; 
imports of between half and 
one million dollars 
Industrial; imports ·of between 
half and one million dollars 
Registered 
Ir:1ports, 19 70 
(Million US$) 
$ · 167. 22 
107 .49 




















. 7 .23]:J 
$ 10.81 
Inc-Gme- and• Sales ta:x-~s 
paid in 1970 












Characteristics of Recent Export Expansion in Latin America," Yale 
Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 183, July 1973, evidence is 
presented showing a significant positive link between the share of a given 
sector's exports going to LAFTA, and the capital-labor ratio of that sector. 
Exports to LAFTA also seem to be more import-intensive than those going 
to the rest of the world. 
?~°R_-1,e 1-cont' d 
.Major L-nporters in Colombia, 1970; Industriel 
Number of 
Companies Classification Registered Number of Minor Exports, 
Imports, 1970 Employees 1970 
(Million US$) (Thousand) (Million US$) 
58 Foreign owned; industrial; 
imports of between $100,000 
and half million dollars 15.43 12.73 $ 3.19 
119 National; industrial; 
'imports of between $100,000 
and half million dollars 27 .. 99 42.11 45,901:.I 
-
177 Industrial; imports of 
between $100,000 and half 
million dollars $ 43.42 54.84 $ 49.09 
320 Grand Total ~ 361.48 159.95 ~ 98.90 
134 Foreign owned 202 .41 50.48 26.79 
186 Nat.ional 159.07 109 .47 72.11 
Sources and method: See text of the chapter for explanation. 
!/ Includes sugar exports. A. total of six sugar companies included in this table exported$ 40.0 Million. 
1/ Refers to only 35 companies. 
Incom2 and 3<' les 













Major Imrort,::!rs in Colombia, 1970; Commercial 
Number of R0gi.stered Number ofCompanies Classification Minor Exports Income and Sales tax~Lnports, 1970 J;:mployees 1970 paf_d in 1970(.Million, US$) (Thousand) (Million US$) (Million Pesos) 
6 Foreign owned; commercial;
imports of more than one
million dollars $ 14 .06 0.88 $ 0,67 55. 78
14 National; commercial;
imports of m«?re than one
million dollars 25.38 9 •s2:!:.I 1.05 16.43 
20 Co;nmercial; imports of more
than one million dollar~ $ 39.44 10.40 $ 1. 72 72.21 
5 Foreign owned; commercial;
imports of ber,7een half, and
one million dollars .. 4.07 0.83 0 22.69 
20 National; commercial; imports
of berMeeP. half and one million
dollars 13 .33 2.02 0.78 · 25.31 
25 Commercial; imports of between
half and one million dollars $ 17 .40 2.85 $ 0.78 48.50 
:"' 
13 Foreign owned; commercial; )
imports of between $100,000
and half million dollars 3.30 2 .01 0.15 15.64
122 National; com:nercial; imports
of between $100,000 ar.d half
million dollars 25.53 13 .04 17. 1711 56~50 
135 Commercial; imports of between 
.;,"100. 000 ~ -1 1 lf~, e,ft-1 1a n:1..t.1.1.on.,,. d 11- ~ "Q 
H
I 
o --:.1rs .,, L·.,. (•0 3 15.05 $ 17.32 i2.14 H 
~ 
T_~b)..~ 2-cont' d 





















$ 85.67 28.30 ·$ 19.82 
21.43 3. 72 0.82 
64.24 24.58 19 .00 
/,,,/ 
Sources and method: See text of the chapter for expl-anation. 
1./ Includes exports of association of banana growers·. 
1/ Refers to only 13 companies 
Income an:i Sales t1:s:-:2s' 




















Imports of more than one million 
dollars; national and foreign, 
industrial and conmerc:i.al 
Imports of between half and one 
.million dollars; n~tional and 
foreign, industrial and comn1ercial 
Imports of between $100,000 and. 
half million dollars; national and 
foreign, industrial and commercial 




Official registered imports under 










$ 145 .20 · 
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Table 4 I.: 
Some characteristics of maior industrial importers, 1970 
Classification 
Foreign owned; im-
ports of more than 







































_ .. (Pesos) 
22,077 
National;• imports 
of more than one 
million dollars 2,040 2,224 54. 8 25.8 16~1' 1,559 393 19,991 ' 
Foreign owned; im-
ports of between 
half and one million 
dollars 2,810 .l,613 70.4 25.9 3.7 454 292 10,442 
National; imports of 
between half and one 
million dollars 1,729 ,'µ., 206 44.4 25.0 16.7 544 370 11,345 
Foreign owned; im-
ports of between 
$100,Q00 and half 
million dollars 2,151 1,212 58.6 5. 2 · 27.6 220 251 10,03.8 
National; imports 
of between $100,000 
and half million 
dollars 1,537 665 50.4 19.3 9.2 354 1,090 
~ 
10,830 
Foreign owned; large 
industrial exporters 








Sources and method: See text of the chapter for expla~ation. 
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Table 5 
Reasons GiVen by INco1,mx for Rejecting Applications f.or Import Licennes, and 
Tabulation of Sample of Re,jected Licenses (totally or in part) durin~ the Second 
Semester of 1971 
(Percentages of All Reasons given for Rejection in Each Category) 
Commerce Industry Official 
1. Commodity is produced within Colombia 24.5 13.3 
2. Requested item csn be replaced by similar 
Colombian goods 5.5 3.2 3.6 
3. Quantity requested is excessive o.6 0.3 1.2 
4. Foreign price is excessive o.6 4.8 2.4 
5. Quantity and/or value requested is excessive 
relative to past record. 0. 9 2.1 0 
6. Im.port or approval category temporarily 
restricted 2.5 o.8 4.8 
7. Inadequate information given to justify need 
f'or requested import, modification or 
addition 1.3 1.4 4.8 
8. Inadequate product description (lack of 
catalogues, etc.) 6.1 3.6 
9. Lack of exact and detailed product sped.fi­
cation in the request, as per existing regula- 1 
tions 10.2 11.5 12.0 
10. Adequate stocks of products are found 
drnnestically o.6 0.1 0 
11. Requests.for identical or similar products 
have been e,pproved recentl:v to petitioner 13 •.4 4.6 1.2 
12. There is shortage of foreign exchange 0.1 0 0 
13. Requested imports out of proportion with 
tuxes pa.id 5. 7 o.8 0 
14. Tex information missing 0.2 o.4 0 
15. Data on imports provided by petitioner do not 
agree with those of INCOMEX 0,5 0 1.2 
16. Excessive expenditures 0.2 0.1 1.2 
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Table ·5-cont' d 
Comm.erce Industry Official 
l.l. Data on sale prices, destined for price 
control agency, a:s.~e lacking 0 0 0 
l.8. other special reasons 9.4 11.3 44.6 
19. Percentage of request granted: 17.6 33.5 6.o 
20% · (o.4) .(0.3) (0) 
25% (O.l} (0.6) (0) 
30% (2.4} (0.7) (0) 
110% (3.2) (3.7} (1.2) 
50% (5.1) (16.2) (4.8) 
60% . (3.4) (6.1) (0) 
(0.2) (0.3) (0)70% 
Unspecified (2.8) (5.6) (0) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Addendum: 
a) Requests for which more than one reason was 
81 75 llrgiven for rejection (totally or partly) 
b) Total of rec,,c,ons e;iven for reject5.ng 
requests (~otally or partly), incl·tlding 
part.:i.al approvals 849 710 83 
Sources e..1'ld Method: See text. 
Table 6 
Average Characteristics of Approved, Rejected &P.artially Rejected Import 
Requests; Sample taken during the Second Semester of 1971 
(Standard Deviation in Parentheses) 
Industrial Cotillle rcial
Partially Partially
Approved Rejected Rejected Approved ReJected Rejected 
Number of company employees 518 407 331 194 126 194
(1,181) (870) (570) (701) (377) (691) 
Import registrations in 1970 1,257 1,154 778 779 617 660(thousand US$) (3,350) (2,640) (2,066) (3,293) (2,603) (2,557) 
Unused 1970 import registrations 9 16 10 8 5(thousand US$) (28) (50) (37) (44) (16) (25)
7 
Value of requested 1971 sample license 9.0 20.9 12.0 1.9 9.3 5.9(thousand US$) (27.5) (28.9) (24. 7) (9. 6) (16.0) (12. 9) 
Income taxes paid in 1970 3,520 2,915 2,387 1,010 1,068 1,155(thousand Pesos) (9,618) (8,746) (7,889) (3,774) (4,411) (4,760) 
Sales taxes paid in 1970 4,516 4,067 2,445 961 694(thousand US$) (31,312) (33,380) 
795
(26,343) (4,592) (3,648) (3,583) 
Minor exports in 1970 358 127 210 20 28 53(thousand US$) (2,040) (436) (1,065) (94) (129) (695) 
Average monthly wages 2,595 2,605 2,305 2,436 2,650 2,451(Pesos) · (3,586) (1,707) (1,849) (1,687) (3,080) (2,118) 
Percentage of licenses in non- 18.2 -0- 2.5 17.8 0.4 6.2reimbursable group (38.6) (15.5) (38. 3) (6.6) (28. 6) 
Number of requests in sample 747 212 325 466 232 517 




Number of requests from Bogota or Medellin 559 167 216 373 177 384 
ID 
II-10 Table 7 
Industrial Categqry: Regressions Explaining Approval (1) or Rejection (O) 
of Import Requests in Sample 
























































Non-reimbursable (1) or reimbursable 
(0) category 
Log of value of all import registra­
tions in 1970 
Log of employees per 1970 imports 
Log of value of requested imports 
Log ef 1970 income and sales truces 
paid per 1970 imports 
Log of 1970 minor exports per 1970 
imports 
Log of average wage 
Percentage of 1970 import 
registrations unused 
Bogota or Medell1n (1) or elsewhere (0) 
F-statistic 
















(6.53) (5 .12) 
,.0.013 0.048 
(2. 79) (2. 71) 
-0.012 -0.047 













II-11 Table 8 
Commercial Category: Regressions Explaining Approval (1) or Rejection (0) 
of Import Requests in Sample 
(Ratio of coefficients to their standard.errors in parentheses) 
Constant 
Non-reimbursable (1) or reimbursable 
(O) category 
Log of.number of employees 
Log of ~alue of 1970 import 
registrations per employee 
Log of value of requested imports 
Log of 1970 income and sales taxes 
paid per employee 
Log of 1970 minor exports per employee 
Log of average_wage 
Percentage of 1970 import registrations 
unused 
Bogota or Medell:i'.'.n (1) or elsewhere (O) 
R2 
F-statistic 











































































































Industrial: Approvals· and Canplete Rejectiot!_s Accor<!i~ng ~- E~11!_pJoyment Size and Reimbursable 
or Non-Reimbursable Cateaories 
. 
Number of Non-
Employees of Reimbursable Non-Reimbursable Grand Total Reimbursables 
Firm Making- To.tal Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentage as Percentage 
the Reguest Requests Approved Requests Approved Requests ~roved of Total 
Less than 55 196 63.8% 24 91.7% 220 66.8% 10.9% 
55-122 183 68.3 20 90.0 203 70.4 9.9 
123-245 193 64.8 31 96.8 224 69.2 13.8 
246-466 174 59.8 25 92.0 199 63.8 12.6 
More than 466 182 72.5 44 97.7 226 77.4 19.5 
Total 928 65.8% 144 94.4% 1.012 69.7% 13.4% 








Industrial: Approvals and Complete Rejections According to Levels pt 
Registered Imports in 1970 1 and Reimbursable or Non-reimbursable Categori~ 
Non-Imports in Reimbursable Non-Reimbursable Grand Total Reimbursable
1970 Total Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentage as Percentage(Thousand US$) Requests Approved RSquests Approved Requests Approved of Total 
Less than 50 217 65.4% 40 87.5% 257 68.9% 15.6% 
50-200 204 65. 7 22 95.5 226 68.6 9.7 
200-500 189 65.6 24 100.0 213 69.5 11.3 
500-2,000 206 61.2 32 100.0 238 66.4 13.4 
More than 2,000 112 75. 9 26 92.3 138 79.0 18.8 
Total 928 65.8% 144 94.4% 11072 69.7% 13.4% 
Sources and method: See text of chapter. 
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Table 11 
Approvals and Complete Rejections According to Emoloyment Size and Geographical Locati,[ndustry: 
Number of
Employees of Bo~ota or MedellS'.n Elsewhere Total 
Firm Making Total Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentaf 
the Request Requests Approved Requests Approved Requests Approve, 
Less than 50 161 66.5% 41 65.9% 202 66.3% 
50-99 112 75.0 39 66.7 151 72.8 
100-199 140 67.1 53 69.8 193 67.9 
200-299 112 70.5 52 5 7. 7 164 66.5 
300-499 97 73.2 48 52.1 145 66.2 
More than 500 153 81.0 64 67 .2 217 77.0 
Total 775 72.1% 297 63.3% 1,072 69.7% 
Sources and method: See text. 
Table 12 
Industry: Approvals and Complete Rejections According to Registered Minor Exports in 1970 and Geographical Location 
Minor Exports Bosota or Medellm Elsewhere Total 
in 1970 Total Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentage 
(thousancLUS_$_2_ Requests Approved Requests Approved Requests ~roved 
Zero 486 72.6% 139 67.6% 625 71.5% 
1-49 152 63.2 63 71.4 215 65.6 
50-399 87 80.5 54 50.0 141 68.8 
400 or more 50 . 80.0 41 53.7 91 68.1-
Total 775 72.1% 297 63.3% _h072 69. 7% 








Industrial: Percentage of Approvals According to 
Bogota or Medellin 
Elsewhere 













Partial Rejections as 
Approvals 
Sources and method: See text of the chapter. 
Mofe than 












Industrial: Multiple Regressions "Explaining" Imports, 
Exports, Wages and Taxes per Employee 



















Constant -1.689 -1.609 -1.248 7.826 




















Bogota or Medellin (1) 














Log. of income and sales 






Log. of 1970 registered 






Log,of 1970 registered minor 






0.318 0.122 0.126 0.211 
F-statistic 99.28 29.64 30.75 56.96 
Observations 1,284 1,284 1,284 1,284 
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Table 15 
Commercial: Multiple Regressions "Explaining" Imports 1 
Wages and Taxes per Employee 





Log. of number of employees 
Foreign owned (O) or national (1) 
Bogota or Medellw (1) or elsewhere (O) 
Log. of average wage 
Log. of income and sales taxes per employee 
Log. of 1970 registered imports per employee 

































































Co::,pHnies in1porting during 1970 more 
Name 
I. Foreign-owned; Industrial 
1. Abonos Colombianos, S.A. (I.P.C.) 
2. Aluminto Alcan De Ccilombia 1 S.A. 
3. Armco Colombiana, S.A. 
4. BASF Qu{mica Colomhiana, S.A. 
5. Bayer de Colombia S.A. 
6. Eris tol Fa1.maclutica S.'A. 
7. Cart!n de Colombia, S.A. 
(Container Corporation of America) 
8. Ccln Colc:nbimrn LTDA. 
9. Cclar,cse Golor.1b:ianc1, S.A. 
10. Cib? Colombiana, S,A. 
11. Colgste Palmoliva, S.A. 
12. Cya1rnr;1id De Colombia, -S.A. 
13. Dow Qu{nica De Colombia,. S .A. 
14. Du Font de Colombia, S .A. 
15. Eli Lilly Intera:i1cricana, Inc. 
lG. Enka De Colombia, S.A. 
17. E.R. Squibb and Sons, S.A. 
18. Eternit Colombiar.a, S.A. 
(Johns Mansvi llc Corporation) 
19. Fabrica Chrysler Colombiana De 
Automotores, S.A. 
than One Million Dollars 
Presumed major activity 
Fertilizers 
Aluminum products 







Textiles (Synthetic fibers) 
Pharmaceuticals 












I20. Fabrica De Hilazas Vanylon, S.A. 
21. C.eneral Electric De Colombia, S.A. 
22. Goodyear De Oolombi.a, S .A. 
✓23. Hilander!as Medellin, S .A. 
(Branch River Wool Combing Co.) 
24. Hilos Cadena 
25. Hoechst Colombiana, S.A. 
26. I.B.M. De Colombia, S.A. 
27. Icollantas S.A. (B.F. Goodrich) 
28. Industrias Phillips De Colombia, S.A. 
29. International Petroleum Colombia Ltda. 
(I.P.C.) 
30. Laboratories Life, S.A. 
3L Le.borator:I.os Undra, S .A. 
I32. Monomeros Colombo-Venezolanos, S.A.* 
33. Monsanto Colombiana, Inc., 
34. Olivetti Coloeibiana, S0 A., 
35. Organizacion Farmactutica Americana 
(Fcremor,t McKesson) 
36. Petroqufmica Colombiana, .S .A. 
(Diamond Shamrock Co.) 
37. Polfmeros Colombianos, S.A. 
38. Productos Quaker, S.A. 
39. Productora De Papeles, S.A. (Grace) 
40. Q~frnica Schering Colombiana, S.A. 
41. Rhinco Productos Qufnicos, S .A. 
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42. Sandoe Colombiana Ltda. 
43. Siemens Colombians, S.A. 
44. SO:?ASA (Renault-IF!) 
45. Texas Petroleum Co. 
46. The Sidney Ross Co. of Colombia 
4 7. Uniroyal Croydon,. S .A. 
48. Aluminio De Colombia, Ltda. 
(Reynolds Metals) 
49. Productos Roche, S.A. 
Pharmaceuticals 






Chemicals and. drugs 
* This is a joint -Colombo-Venezuelan venture, with public sector participation. 
lhus, its nature is quite different from the rest of the companies in this list. 
N.B. Co'mpnnies placed by INCOMEX under both the Industrial and Commercial 
categories are here listed only under "Industrial". 
II. Foreign-owned; Commercial 
1. Distribuidora Nissan, Ltda. 
2. Distribuidora Toyota, Ltda. 
3. Kodak Colombiana, Ltda. 
4. Produc tos Quimicos Esso, Inc. 
5. Shell Colombiana, S.A. 




III. Nc1tional; Industrial 
1. Acerfas Paz Del Rio, S.A. Steel 
2. Bavaria, S.A. 'Beer 
3. Britilana Benrey Ltda. ? 
4. Cano Isaza y Cia. ? 
5. Cales y Cementos De Toloviejo, S.A. Construction materials 
6. Carvajal y Cia. Printing 
7. Casa Editorial El Tiernpo Publishing 
s. Cementos del Caribe, s;A. Cement 
9. Cia. Colombiana De .(\.lcalis Chemicals 
10. C:i.a. Colombiana De Tabaco Cigarettes 
11. Cia. Colombiana De Tejidos (Coltejer) Textiles 
12. Cia. Pintuco Paints
,
13. Consorcio Metalurgicc Nacional, S.A. Metals 
Steel products14. Cor.poracion_de Acero (Corpacero) 
15. David y Eduardo Puyana Liquor and cigaretts 
16. Detergentes Limitada Detergents 
"d , i . s ••A Steel productsM17. E•mpresa ~1.erurg ca, 
I'.
18. Fabrica De Hilados y Tejidos Del Hato Textiles 
19. F{brica Nacional De Chocolates,_S.A. Food products 
Beve~ages.20. Gaseosas Posada Tobon, S.A. 
Mining of salt21. IFI-Ccncesion de Salinas 
22. Leon:i.das Lara e hijos .Agricultural machinery and autos 
23. Lloreda, Jabones y Glicerina Ltda. Soaps, detergents 
24. Planta Colombiana De Soda Chemicals 
25. Productos Fitosanitarios De Colombia, S.A. ? 
·Toiletries and soap26. Rosemberg Hermanos e Rijos 
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27. Siderurgica Del Pacifico, S.A. Steel products 
28. Vitabono, S.A. Fertilizers 
29. Empresa Colombiana de Cables, S.A. Steel cables 
30. Tejidos Leticia Ltda. Textiles 
31. F'acomec, S .A. Electrical equipment 
IV. National; Cornrnerc:i.al 
1. Alrnacenes Ange 1, S .A. 
2. Avianca 
3. Central Colombiana Auto-Agricola Ltda. 
4. Corpal . 
5. Distribu:i.dora Quimica Rolanda-Colombia, 
S .A. 
6. Distribuidora Saja Ltda. 
7. Drogueria Gutierrez 
8. Ingenieros·Civiles Asociados 
9. Jorge Manuel Gomez (Jomago) 
10. Nepomuceno Cartegena e Rijos 
11. Pfaff De Colombia, S .A. 
12. Preco Ltda. 
13. Almacen El Motorista 
14. D:i.stribui.dora Pantecnica, S.A. 
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